Abstract
The modern-day vehicle is evolved in a cyber-physical system with internal networks (controller area network (CAN), Ethernet, etc.) connecting hundreds of micro-controllers. From the traditional core vehicle functions, such as vehicle controls, infotainment, and power-train management, to the latest developments, such as advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) and automated driving features, each one of them uses CAN as their communication network backbone. Automated driving and ADAS features rely on data transferred over the CAN network from multiple sensors mounted on the vehicle. Verifying the integrity of the sensor data is essential for the safety and security of occupants and the proper functionality of these applications. Though the CAN interface ensures reliable data transfer, it lacks basic security features, including message authentication, which makes it vulnerable to a wide array of attacks, including spoofing, replay, DoS, etc. Using traditional cryptography-based methods to verify the integrity of data transmitted over CAN interfaces is expected to increase the computational complexity, latency, and overall cost of the system. In this paper, we propose a light-weight alternative to verify the sensor data’s integrity for vehicle applications that use CAN networks for data transfers. To this end, a framework for 2-dimensional quantization index modulation (2D QIM)-based data hiding is proposed to achieve this goal. Using a typical radar sensor data transmission scenario in an autonomous vehicle application, we analyzed the performance of the proposed framework regarding detecting and localizing the sensor data tampering. The effects of embedding-induced distortion on the applications using the radar data were studied through a sensor fusion algorithm. It was observed that the proposed framework offers the much-needed data integrity verification without compromising on the quality of sensor fusion data and is implemented with low overall design complexity. This proposed framework can also be used on any physical network interface other than CAN, and it offers traceability to in-vehicle data beyond the scope of the in-vehicle applications.
Highlights
In the last 20 years, the automotive industry has seen rapid growth in the usage of electronic control units (ECUs) to implement various technology features, such as dynamic vehicle control, infotainment, and advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) safety features
We propose to introduce freshness in the watermark generation process based on the data available on the in-vehicle network such as the GPS timestamp to generate a watermark to be embedded into the sensor data that need to be secured
Digital watermarking methods have a significant advantage over the traditional cryptography methods when it comes to the resource-constrained systems where the interface bandwidth or the computation resources are a bottleneck
Summary
In the last 20 years, the automotive industry has seen rapid growth in the usage of electronic control units (ECUs) to implement various technology features, such as dynamic vehicle control, infotainment, and ADAS safety features. To deal with such implementation level and practical shortcomings of the traditional data integrity verification methods, we introduce a new data hiding-based watermarking approach This approach solves the problem of the data integrity verification in resource-constrained and real-time applications with simple algorithms that do not tax the system with high computational complexity and at the same time do not increase the bandwidth requirements of the interface, as no additional data are added to the payload. In this method, the watermark is embedded into the sensor using a light-weight software algorithm, which is easy to implement. The proposed watermarking method was implemented on the processed radar data and its effects on the outcome of a sensor fusion algorithm were verified
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