Racism as Disrespect

Abstract

Racism can be subtle or overt, it can be intentional or unintentional, and it can be conscious or unconscious. Actions can be racist. Policies can be racist. Arguably even whole countries can be racist. And, of course, people can be racist. While there is some excitement over the proposition that only the most powerful members of a society can be racist within it, a consensus seems to be emerging that just about anyone can be racist. Perhaps, then, as racism is capable of worming its way into so many diverse corners of life, it should not come as a surprise that there is considerable disagreement over what is common to racism’s variegated forms. Indeed, some recent writings embrace the prospect that the nature of racism may resist being captured in a single, monistic formula. Here I want to go against that trend and propose a unified account of racism. The essence of my proposal is that racism can be understood in terms of disrespect. A couple of background methodological principles are assumed in making the case for this proposal. As an attempt to capture the content of our current, ordinary concept of racism, the adequacy criterion operative here is that an analysis should accommodate ordinary usage of relevant terms, terms like ‘racism’. I will return to this point at the end of the article, but privileging analyses that accommodate ordinary usage does not entail that we cannot make mistakes in how we deploy the relevant terms—a point that is especially