Abstract
Mass atrocity prevention has been controversial, both when members of the international community have taken action as well as when they have failed to do so. In 1999, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged the international community to reconcile the need to respect state sovereignty with the need to protect populations from egregious human rights violations. R2P’s emergence offered an opportunity to move past the discourse and practice associated with its predecessor—“humanitarian intervention.” However, while R2P has succeeded in changing the discourse, it has failed to make a change in practice. A source of this failure is R2P’s “ulterior motive exemption.” Using the R2P intervention in Libya as a case study, this article concludes that because ulterior motives existed: (1) NATO’s primary intent of civilian protection quickly evolved into the intent to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi; (2) in exceeding its mandate, NATO committed an act of aggression; (3) NATO continued to militarily support the rebels while they<em> </em>were committing war crimes and severe human rights violations; (4) NATO’s actions resulted in civilian casualties, which NATO has refused to investigate; and (5) NATO abdicated its responsibility to protect Libyans from the human suffering that continued subsequent to Qaddafi’s execution.
Highlights
At the end of a decade that saw varied responses to numerous mass atrocities, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged the international community to reconcile the need to preserve state sovereignty rights with the human right to be protected from the most egregious forms of human rights violations
This article concludes that because ulterior motives existed: (1) NATO’s primary intent of civilian protection quickly evolved into the primary intent of overthrowing Muammar Qaddafi; (2) in exceeding what was mandated by Security Council Resolution 1973, NATO committed an act of aggression in violation of the UN Charter; (3) NATO continued to militarily support the rebels despite the fact that they were committing war crimes and egregious human rights violations; (4) NATO’s actions resulted in civilian casualties, which NATO has refused to investigate; and (5) NATO abdicated its responsibility to protect Libyans from the human suffering that continued subsequent to Qaddafi’s execution
Prashad asks a series of pertinent questions: “The real question is, why won’t NATO allow an evaluation of the Libyan war? What if we discover that the number of civilian casualties, the bombing in places like Marjah, the bombing in places in the center of Tripoli, had cost the lives of a very large number of civilians? What is the harm of NATO coming under an evaluation?” (Goodman, 2012)
Summary
At the end of a decade that saw varied responses to numerous mass atrocities, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged the international community to reconcile the need to preserve state sovereignty rights with the human right to be protected from the most egregious forms of human rights violations. Evans and Thakur (2013) argue that if interventions are truly motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns, the solidarity implied by its implementation would be expressed prior and subsequent to the military intervention. In their concerted efforts to distance R2P from its predecessors, Evans and Thakur (2013; Thakur, 2015) have demonstrated a preoccupation with celebrating the change in discourse ushered in by R2P, while failing to objectively evaluate whether the change in discourse can effectively change the way states intervene for alleged humanitarian purposes in practice. As will be demonstrated through an analysis of the NATO-led intervention in Libya, R2P’s “ulterior motive exemption” ensures the likelihood that the overall change in discourse around intervention for alleged civilian protection will not be met with a similar change in practice. This article concludes that because ulterior motives existed: (1) NATO’s primary intent of civilian protection quickly evolved into the primary intent of overthrowing Muammar Qaddafi; (2) in exceeding what was mandated by Security Council Resolution 1973, NATO committed an act of aggression in violation of the UN Charter; (3) NATO continued to militarily support the rebels despite the fact that they were committing war crimes and egregious human rights violations; (4) NATO’s actions resulted in civilian casualties, which NATO has refused to investigate; and (5) NATO abdicated its responsibility to protect Libyans from the human suffering that continued subsequent to Qaddafi’s execution
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