Abstract

In a symmetrical static game model, this paper is mainly concerned with the research and development (R&D) strategy of the High Technology (HT) industry and the society’s optimal R&D level given the investment revenue. We obtain different investment decision with different amount of firms engaging in the R&D and each firm’s expected profit respectively. When the risk (the probability each firm succeed) is not random, it’s socially desirable to have more firm engaging in R&D if and only if the relationship among the invest cost, the probability and the prize satisfies some condition, that is,Eπ(n⩾Eπ,(n−1)⇔I⩽α(1−α) n−1 V. When the R&D costI is certain, more prizes or higher probability will make more firms engage in the R&D and higher prize makes it’s socially desirable to have more firm invest in R&D.

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