Quixotic jousting over mental states

Sebastian Kraemer

doi:10.1192/pb.35.7.277

Abstract

Neither Thomas Szasz[1][1] nor Edward Shorter[2][2] grasps the nettle of mental pain, which is at the heart of the psychiatric experience. As in any institution, consensus in medicine is a political process; Shorter represents the one we have now, which is that doctors treat lesions. (The

Highlights

I was interested to read Curtis et al’s analysis of the proportionality principle and what it means in practice.[1]
Consensus in medicine is a political process; Shorter represents the one we have which is that doctors treat lesions. (The neurologist Henry Miller declared over 40 years ago that ‘psychiatry is neurology without physical signs’.3) Szasz’s charge is that this stance deprives patients of a responsibility to make use of the help they seek
What is Szasz’s ‘active patient’ to do with a doctor who only wants to look at his or her brain? Psychiatry is diminished to the extent that it cannot face the experience of patients and their desire to be understood, as well as treated

Summary

Introduction

I was interested to read Curtis et al’s analysis of the proportionality principle and what it means in practice.[1]. I was interested to read Curtis et al’s analysis of the proportionality principle and what it means in practice.[1] I was intrigued as to the authors’ views on the role of balancing (in the legal sense) in reaching decisions day to day in relation to patient healthcare and the competing interests related to the use of the Mental Health Act. Certainly, proportionality has been described by some as the dominant underlying theme of the European Convention on Human Rights, but others argue that the principle of balancing has had at least as prominent a role to play in UK courts.

Results

Conclusion