Abstract
AbstractThe closest ancestor of Second Philosophy is Quine's naturalism. This chapter details the Second Philosopher's departures from Quinean orthodoxy: the Quinean chooses naturalism in response to the failures of first philosophy, the Second Philosopher simply begins in her characteristic ways; she doesn't share his empiricism leanings, e.g., in her modified approach to epistemology naturalized; her reactions to radical skepticism differ from his; and perhaps most dramatically, she rejects his holism. These differences ramify into the philosophy of logic, mathematics, and natural science in subsequent chapters.
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