Queuing Without Patience: A Novel Transaction Selection Mechanism in Blockchain for IoT Enhancement

Abstract

There is evidence that blockchain plays a crucial role in the Internet of Things (IoT)-based implementation due to its transparency, traceability, and immutability, in which the participants are incentivized to behave authentically and precisely for rewards. Despite the domination of subsidy in reward, the decrease of the mining rate and the imperativeness of fees make the fee market become a pivotal role to motivate miners in the blockchain. However, the current mechanism for selecting transactions into a block poses a risk to the stability of the system, which stems from the vicious competition of users and the insufficient incentives of miners. In this article, we propose a novel transaction selection mechanism by leveraging the Lyapunov optimization and large deviation theory. This article is: 1) fair because the proposed mechanism is not single-factor dominated, both personal utility of the miner and overall utility of the system are taken into account; 2) sustainable since miners are incentivized greatly to guarantee the mining behavior; and 3) robust . The analysis based on the large deviation theory enhances the robustness of the blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider both miner’s benefit as well as system benefit to establish a better fee market in the blockchain for IoT enhancement. Our theoretical analyses and simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.