Abstract

one Distinguishing virtue ethics from the ethics of duty Why do you think it is important to be virtuous? Can you think of a virtue that is not morally important? What do you understand by the notion of “character”? Why is it important for virtue ethics to say what it is to be a good human being? Is it possible for people to agree on what a good human being is? What do you understand by “particularism”? Why is virtue ethics particularist? Why is making a morally difficult decision a risk? Can this risk be overcome by appealing to moral principles? How is Carol Gilligan's distinction between a “justice perspective” and a “caring perspective” relevant to the distinction between an ethics of duty and virtue ethics? How would you distinguish “reasons externalism” from “reasons internalism”? Why does virtue ethics prefer the latter? Explicate the concepts of “foundationalism” and “hermeneutics”. What is the relevance of these concepts to our understanding of virtue ethics? Do you think it is important or even possible to seek the foundations for our moral norms? What is the problem of relativism and why does it seem to be an acute problem for virtue ethics? How would you answer the charge of relativism if you were a virtue theorist? Why does the ethics of duty tend to assume a dualistic moral psychology? What does it mean to say that virtue ethics is, by contrast, holistic? […]

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