Abstract
On 22 January 2021, the <em>Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</em> (TPNW) entered into force. The TPNW has resulted in a mixed response from the international community, instigating much discussion on certain provisions and features of the TPNW. Yet underpinning these analyses rests a commonly shared premise; that the TPNW constitutes a further example of humanitarian disarmament, placing the interests of victims and humanity at the centre of discussions of nuclear weapons and disarmament. This article seeks to reveal a coinciding yet somewhat underexplored, hidden nature of the TPNW by demonstrating how the treaty also incorporates State-based security-driven interests alongside these humanitarian aspirations. While most commentators do not deny the existence of such interests at stake in the TPNW process, few have analysed the extent to which State-based security considerations have been incorporated in the final text of the TPNW. After having revealed the continued presence of State-centred security considerations in the TPNW’s negotiation, preambular provisions and operative text, this article concludes by discussing some possible implications stemming from the determination that the TPNW is inspired by, and reflects, both humanitarian and security objectives.
Highlights
Russia and China later supported a similar joint statement released in October 2018.6 the the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has slowly been edging towards entry-intoforce, and achieved its 50th ratification, by Honduras on 24 October 2020.7 In accordance with Article 15(1), the TPNW entered into force on 22 January 2021 and its obligations are binding upon each State party that has ratified the agreement
They have supported this assertion by tracing the negotiating history of the TPNW and identifying certain human-centred provisions to emphasise how the treaty instigates a new era of humanitarian-inspired normative pressure on the nuclear weapon-possessing States (NWPS) by stigmatising and delegitimising nuclear weapons on the basis of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences stemming from their use
This article began with an important point that is worth repeating once more;246 it is beyond question that humanitarian-based objectives contributed towards, and inspired, the negotiation of the TPNW
Summary
The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in July 2017 has been described as ‘the end of a period of stagnation’ in international nuclear disarmament law which has lasted more than twenty years. While TPNW proponents have hailed the treaty as a ‘welcome addition to the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime’,3 the nuclear weapon-possessing States (NWPS) and various commentators have criticised the treaty as both conceptually flawed and ‘idealistic’.4 On the day of the TPNW’s adoption, the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and France announced that they ‘do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party’ to the treaty. Russia and China later supported a similar joint statement released in October 2018.6 the TPNW has slowly been edging towards entry-intoforce, and achieved its 50th ratification, by Honduras on 24 October 2020.7 In accordance with Article 15(1), the TPNW entered into force on 22 January 2021 and its obligations are binding upon each State party that has ratified the agreement.. The analysis that follows offers evidence for this claim by highlighting certain shared characteristics of ‘traditional’, or security-based disarmament instruments identified elsewhere by proponents of humanitarian disarmament such as Bonnie Docherty and Patrick McCarthy.18 By referring to these common features and characteristics identified by advocates of humanitarian disarmament, this article seeks to shed light on a presently hidden layer of the TPNW’s underlying purpose and turns to discuss some possible implications that this revealed security-driven nature may have for our assessment and engagement with the TPNW, humanitarian disarmament and efforts to categorise disarmament instruments generally.
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