Abstract
Among the most recent examples of works dealing with the history of Kant’s sources, the work by C. Dyck deserves a special place both for his ambitious goal and the breadth ofthe historical analysis that accompanies this goal. The author’s basic assumption is that, “In contrast to the narrowly rationalistic approach to the soul which would proceed completely independently of experience, the rational psychology pioneered by the theorists of the German tradition relies essentially upon empirical psychology”. Indeed, according to Wolff, when our investigation comes to the soul it “is to be considered rationalistic only in a much broader sensein that [… it] is not limited to what can be directly known through experience” (p. 9).
Highlights
In the second chapter, the author delves into the different shades of Wolff’s rational psychology insofar as it is received and partially reinterpreted by the Wolffian School
That Baumgarten made such a clear generalization concerning the “actions of the soul” and not concerning its other characteristics does not weaken in any sense the undeniable continuity between the two branches of psychology, which is defended by the author
Baumgarten’s concept of experience, even if apparently similar to the Wolffian one, is much more focused on the possibility of discovering a form of rationality that is peculiarly detectable from the sensible experience of the singular I: “I think [cogito] about my present state
Summary
Lorini rightly emphasizes the importance of A. The considerable emphasis Lorini places on these differences leads him at one point to suggest that it is Baumgarten and not Wolff who is Kant’s “main concern.” This conclusion might go too far (and in any case, it is Wolffian psychology, not Wolff, that I take to be Kant’s principal concern), yet there is no denying that Baumgarten’s rational psychology (or his metaphysics more generally) is distinguished from Wolff’s. While these differences are sometimes wholly ascribed to his independent interest in Leibniz, I have argued elsewhere that Baumgarten’s intellectual and personal connection to the Pietists in Halle ( through his upbringing at the famous Waisenhaus) accounts for some of his departures from Wolff.[14] Even so, Baumgarten’s particular presentation of the (Wolffian) relation between the rational and empirical disciplines clearly exercised an important influence on Kant. The point, is that Baumgarten no doubt exercised an important influence on Kant’s discussion of rational (and empirical) psychology, but this influence is better understood in conjunction with a variety of other thinkers (and not just Wolff) who led Kant to appreciate some of the resources, and many of the difficulties, in Baumgarten’s thought
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
