Question-Begging and Cumulativeness in Dialectical Games

Abstract

In two recent articles [8] and [7], the authors argue thatpetitioprincipii is better understood as an epistemic rather than an alethic fallacy. In another article [ 1] we seek for an epistemic analysis of the petitio based on the von Wright-Geach notion of entailment. However, other writers, e.g., Hamblin [3], have serious reservations about the usefulness of epistemic logic for the exploration of the fallacies and are themselves inclined to think that formal dialogues (games of dialectic) offer a more fruitful approach. Still, it has long seemed to us that dialectical theory can flounder in perplexities that are just as formidable as those of epistemic logic, and that the analysis of circular argumentation affords striking confirmation of the point. In this paper we further pursue solutions to some of these problems. It is our hope that we may move some steps beyond our efforts of 1978. The dialectical perspective has strong ties historically with the development of doctrines of the fallacies, and these ties are documented by Hamblin [3] in enough detail to show how powerful the dialectical tradition has been, never mind its contemporary neglect. In western philosophy the dialectical tradition originates in the Platonic dialogues and in Aristotle's attempts in the Topics and De Sophisticis Elenchis to formulate rules of argumentation in a quasi-formal manner and to describe and propose solutions for certain sophistical refutations. In the Middle Ages, from the thirteenth through the sixteenth century, we find numerous treatises by such influential logicians as Burley, Buridan, Strode, Albert of Saxony, Paul of Venice, all dealing with a dialectical game call Obligation. In Obligation, the task of the opponent is to draw out various impossibilities from apositum [position; argument] which is to be upheld by thexrespondent.