Queer Theory by Men

Abstract

In this essay I present parts--not all--of my argument that it would be good for left pro-sex intellectual and political work, including feminist work of this kind, if people doing it could occasionally Take Break from Feminism. (1) The essay has four main parts and an Appendix. In Part I, I attempt minimalist definition of as it is now practiced and produced in the United States, and draw some rudimentary distinctions among various forms of that fall within this definition. The basic idea here is that minimalist definition of actually maximizes the range of projects that can be described as feminist, and makes it harder to Take Break from them. In Part II, I give an extremely cursory genealogy of feminism, gay-identity politics and queer theory. In Part III, I analyze two examples of queer theory by men. These are close readings; by that means I attempt to find with some precision the trajectory of these postmodernizing, sex-positive, left analytics of sexuality and the precise points of their debt to and departure from feminism. The basic idea here is to travel deeply into the domain that could be called queer theory and to start the journey as far as possible from feminism; it seemed to me likely (and I think it turned out to be the case) that my two male authors--one gay man, the other straight one--would place themselves in relation to rather than in it and would therefore make manifest some conceptual and/or political possibilities for Taking Break from Feminism (and would also give me the pleasure of identifying publicly with them and disseminating their work). In Part IV, I give close reading of fascinating legal decision, Twyman v. Twyman, (2) following protocol I have developed that allows highly divergent theoretical hypotheses to generate highly divergent re-readings of legal texts. The point here is to see whether there can be any conceptual upsides to re-reading the case deploying hypotheses that Take Break from Feminism. For legal readers this section should provide whatever payoff they might be able to derive from all the preceding analytic work. Finally, in the Appendix I deduce from the experience of writing Part III (and of reading in the field more broadly) some maxima for queer theory, feminist and otherwise. I. A MINIMALIST DEFINITION OF FEMINISM, AND SOME DISTINCTIONS Here are some observations about how defines and taxonomizes itself in the United States today. I am not claiming that these attributes are essential in the sense that they are absolute or natural; rather that they are essential in the sense that current conventions seem to require them as disciplinary matter. First, to be feminism, position must make distinction between M and F. Different feminisms do this differently: some see and women, some see male and female, some see masculine and feminine. While men and women will almost always be imagined as distinct human groups, the other paired terms can describe many different things: traits, narratives, introjects. However particular manages these subsidiary questions, it is not a feminism unless it turns in some central or core way on distinction between M and F. Second, to be in the United States today, position must posit some kind of subordination as between M and F, in which F is the disadvantaged or subordinated element. At this point is descriptive and not normative: M>F. And third (here is the normative turn), opposes the subordination of F. It frames itself as justice or emancipatory project. As between M and F, and possibly because M>F, carries brief for F. I think these attributes are noticeable in virtually every form of in the United States today, and will treat them as definitional--as essential in an Aristotelian sense. (3) Beyond that, feminisms can be distinguished in many ways. …