Québec's “America Problem”: Differential Threat Perception in the North American Security Community

Abstract

Does the Quebec of the early twenty-first century, by which I mean Quebec society and not necessarily the government of Quebec, have an problem? Is it experiencing something akin to the the United States was said, by John MacCormac, to have had during an earlier period of geostrategic upheaval--a problem stemming from a differentiated of, and reaction to, geopolitical threat? (1) Survey data over the past several years suggest that Quebeckers have become more critical not only of the American government but also of Americans in general than is the case with their counterparts in English Canada; indeed, even on the question of trade retaliation against the United States over the softwood lumber issue, Quebeckers outpace other Canadians when it comes to an appetite for engaging in commercial tit-for-tat. (2) Much of the recent testiness of the Quebec public vis-a-vis America has occurred as American foreign policy has become increasingly militarized, strongly hinting at a significant difference between the manner in which Americans and Quebeckers interpret threat in the world since 11 September 2001 (hereafter referred to by the shorthand formula, 9/11). This article examines both the sources and the potential consequences of this threat within North America, with particular emphasis upon (a) Canada-U.S. relations, (b) the national-unity question in Canada, and (c) the place of the United States with respect to a future Quebec referendum on sovereignty. Threat Perception and Allies It is generally considered that, among the numerous elements that impel governmental decision makers to action, one stands out: the of a clear and present danger to national security. Not only does the appearance of a crisp threat on the horizon have the ability to bestir often confused policy entities within states to coherent and robust activity, but it can similarly bring about a surprising (if never perfect) degree of harmony between states. (3) You do not have to be a realist--either of the structural or of the classical variety--to accept the proposition that common threat can elicit common resolve in meeting it. But what threat can entice together, it can also drive apart. The 2003 Iraq war is a good example of the tensions that can be generated, even between close allies, when those allies take a differing perspective on the threat. (4) For instance, Canada and the United States, which after 9/11 seemed to be headed toward tighter military integration as a result of the imperatives of the war on terror, (5) would soon fall out over what, if anything, Iraq had to do with that conflict. Importantly, nowhere in Canada was the sense of alienation from American policy greater than in Quebec, which a decade earlier had been heralded as the most part of the country, if not one of the most pro-American parts of the whole world. (6) My purpose in this article is to examine both the sources and the potential consequences of differential threat perception (DTP) within North America. I chose the concept DTP advisedly, for it is a punning allusion to another concept in international relations theory, one that has garnered wide if not total acceptance among scholars--namely, democratic peace theory (or DPT). For adherents of DPT, security communities among liberal democracies are virtually idiot-proof in the sense that no matter how bad relations might become between members of the community, there exists little if any risk that armed conflict could break out, or that even the threat of such conflict could be broached. Thus, that there might at times be tensions, even great strain, in relations between liberal democracies may be regretted, but it is hardly a major problem, since the downside risk of such tensions is structurally much less than it would otherwise be, were one or both of the disputants to be non-liberal democracies, or even worse, non-liberal non-democracies. …