“Quasi Track-One” Diplomacy: An Analysis of the Geneva Process in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict1

Abstract

The diversity of unofficial diplomacy activities in the last three decades has led to extensive attention in theoretical literature to the role of unofficial diplomacy in conflict resolution processes and to the development of a broad range of concepts used to describe different types of unofficial diplomatic activities. Yet certain unofficial activities, such as the process that preceded the Geneva Accords, do not neatly conform to the prevailing unofficial diplomacy concepts. This study seeks to contribute to the theoretical development of the unofficial diplomacy theory through an examination of the assumptions underlying models and concepts relating to unofficial diplomacy as applied to the process leading to the drafting of the Geneva Accords. The study suggests that the unofficial diplomacy process leading to the Geneva Accords was in fact “a quasi track-one” diplomacy—a diplomacy characterized by unique features, some of which weakened its potential contribution to the policy-making process.