Quasi-Psychologism about Collective Intention

Matthew Rachar

doi:10.1007/s10677-021-10188-2

Abstract

This paper argues that a class of popular views of collective intention, which I call “quasi-psychologism”, faces a problem explaining common intuitions about collective action. Views in this class hold that collective intentions are realized in or constituted by individual, mental, participatory intentions. I argue that this metaphysical commitment entails persistence conditions that are in tension with a purported obligation to notify co-actors before leaving a collective action attested to by participants in experimental research about the interpersonal normativity of collective action. I then explore the possibilities open to quasi-psychologists for responding to this research.

Highlights

This paper argues that a class of popular views of collective intention, which I call “quasipsychologism”, faces a problem explaining common intuitions about collective action
I argue that this metaphysical commitment entails persistence conditions that are in tension with a purported obligation to notify coactors before leaving a collective action attested to by participants in experimental research about the interpersonal normativity of collective action
This thought naturally leads to three questions: (1) what kinds of things are collective intentions, if collectives don’t have minds and intentions are normally mental states? (2) how do our individual mental states stand to the collective intentions we form when we act together? And (3) what relations do collective intentions require between the people who have them?

Summary

The Metaphysical and Normative Axes of Collective Intention

The metaphysical axis concerns the strength of connection between individual psychological states and collective intentions. Quasi-psychological views are initially plausible since they explain two central features of collective intentions, the interdependence they create between participants and their motivational force These features are often taken to be unaccounted for by the other kinds of views. I’ll argue that some recent empirical results, presented, may be one These results cast doubt on the ability of quasipsychological views to fulfil the purpose of introducing collective intention in the first place, namely explaining collective action. It appears they fail to provide the right background to properly characterize the normative relations between people who are acting together. I’ll discuss the empirical research concerning our social practices surrounding collective action

Justification and Results

The Way Forward - a Dual-Aspect View

Conclusion