Abstract
Relying on the merit goods concept developed by Richard A. Musgrave, this paper introduces the notion of quasi-merit good. The criteria of eligibility for merit goods are vague. Quasi-merit good constitutes a special case where government protection and sponsorship are obtained via public choice influenced by special interests or a misconception. I claim that private bank deposits are a quasi-merit good meant to satisfy the public want of bank stability and uninterrupted supply of household savings into the financial system. Bank stakeholders join with other social and political groups to demand government intervention. It becomes institutionalized in the shape of a government-backed deposit protection scheme that ‘nudges’ depositors to act in a desirable way. Government assumes an implicit liability under deposit guarantee, but may be required to inject public funds to keep the scheme running. Deposit protection has distributional effects: welfare is redistributed in favor of special interests. Its premature enactment generates massive moral hazard among depositors and bankers.
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