Quasi-landlord port financing in China: Features, practice and a contract theory analysis

Abstract

Since the 1970s and 80s, landlord port has been the dominant port financing model in western large and medium-sized container ports. In China, many prospective port projects have also explored a landlord port financing model. However, some evidence suggests that landlord port financing in China is a variant of the international mainstream landlord port financing model. Based on an explanation of their unique features and practices, this paper analyzes the Chinese quasi-landlord port financing model from a contract theory perspective, in which it can be viewed as a double-level principal–agent relationship and two-layer profit distribution contract with three participants: the state-owned assets administration department, the port investment company and the operators. Furthermore, the results show that in the Chinese quasi-landlord port financing model, whether in the case of both joint venture and port land lease (fixed rent), or in the case of both joint venture and port land transfer, the optimal incentive scheme is the same as in the international landlord port financing model with profit sharing rent or mixed rent.