Quantum Measurements with, and Yet without an Observer.

Dmitri Sokolovski

doi:10.3390/e22101185

Abstract

It is argued that Feynman’s rules for evaluating probabilities, combined with von Neumann’s principle of psycho-physical parallelism, help avoid inconsistencies, often associated with quantum theory. The former allows one to assign probabilities to entire sequences of hypothetical Observers’ experiences, without mentioning the problem of wave function collapse. The latter limits the Observer’s (e.g., Wigner’s friend’s) participation in a measurement to the changes produced in material objects, thus leaving his/her consciousness outside the picture.

Highlights

There was a renewed interest in whether quantum theory is internally consistent in its present form, or if new assumptions need to be added to its already well established principles
The wave function of the observed system is supposed to undergo a sudden change once a definite result of the observation becomes known to the Observer
Quantum mechanics relies on a set of axiomatic rules, which cannot be explained “from within the theory”

Summary

Introduction

There was a renewed interest in whether quantum theory is internally consistent in its present form, or if new assumptions need to be added to its already well established principles. The wave function of the observed system is supposed to undergo a sudden change once a definite result of the observation becomes known to the Observer. This change, reminiscent of what happens to a probability distribution in classical statistics once additional information is received, may have something to do with Observer’s consciousness. One extreme view includes consciousness into a quantum mechanical calculation directly [12], or grants it an active role in the reshaping of the collapsed wave function [13]. One finds theories aiming at denying the Observer any special status at all as happens, for example, in the consistent histories approach (CHA) [5,14]. Would it be possible to have a universal quantum theory centred on the Observer’s subjective perceptions, and yet applying its mathematical apparatus only to material objects, whenever Observer’s probability are calculated? One might look for an answer in the literature

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Conclusion