Abstract
Despite the enormous theoretical and experimental progress made so far in quantum key distribution (QKD), the security of most existing practical QKD systems is not rigorously established yet. A critical obstacle is that almost all existing security proofs make ideal assumptions on the QKD devices. Problematically, such assumptions are hard to satisfy in the experiments, and therefore it is not obvious how to apply such security proofs to practical QKD systems. Fortunately, any imperfections and security-loopholes in the measurement devices can be perfectly closed by measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), and thus we only need to consider how to secure the source devices. Among imperfections in the source devices, correlations between the sending pulses and modulation fluctuations are one of the principal problems, which unfortunately most of the existing security proofs do not consider. In this paper, we take into account these imperfections and enhance the implementation security of QKD. Specifically, we consider a setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC) framework in which the sending pulses can present arbitrary correlations but they are independent of the previous setting choices such as the bit, the basis and the intensity settings. Within the framework of SCIC, we consider the dominant fluctuations of the sending states, such as the relative phases and the intensities, and provide a self-contained information-theoretic security proof for the loss-tolerant QKD protocol in the finite-key regime. We demonstrate the feasibility of secure quantum communication, and thus our work constitutes a crucial step towards guaranteeing the security of practical QKD systems.
Highlights
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1] is one of the most promising applications of quantum information processing, and it is on the verge of global commercialisation
If these models do not faithfully capture the physical properties of the actual QKD devices, the security of the systems is no longer guaranteed. Such discrepancies between device models assumed in security proofs and the properties of actual devices could be exploited by Eve to attack both the source[3,4] and the detection apparatuses in refs 5–12. It is indispensable for realising secure QKD to develop security proof techniques that can be applied to actual devices
We consider the dominant fluctuations of the sending state, such as the relative phase[26,31,32,33] and the intensity[26,27,34,35] within the framework of setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC), and we provide an information-theoretic security proof in the finite-key regime
Summary
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1] is one of the most promising applications of quantum information processing, and it is on the verge of global commercialisation. The latter case (SCDC) occurs when the ith sending state could depend on the previous setting choices that Alice has made up to the (i − 1)th pulse.
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