Abstract

The prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution (QKD) has the merits of fast speed, high key generation rate, and easy implementation. However, the detector side channel attacks greatly undermine the security of the key bits. The eavesdropper, Eve, exploits the flaws of the detectors to obtain illegal information without violating quantum principles. It means that she can intervene in the communication without being detected. A prepare-and-measure Bell test protocol will be proposed. By randomly carrying out Bell test at the side of the information receiver, Bob, Eve’s illegal information gain within the detector side channel attack can be well bounded. This protocol does not require any improvement on the detectors used in available prepare-and-measure QKD. Though we only illustrate its application in the BB84 protocol, it is applicable for any prepare-and-measure QKD.

Highlights

  • QKD is a real-time art of generating secure key bit string between remote partners[1,2,3]

  • The photons registered by the detectors may be not the ones expected by Bob, but well devised by Eve to obtained illegal information

  • According to her measurement outcomes, she exploits the detection efficiency mismatches and prepares a fake state to be detected by Bob[15]

Read more

Summary

The value of the CHSH polynomial is calculated to be SCHSH

Alice prepares the state on Photon B and transfers it to Bob. Bob measures it in randomly chosen basis to read its state. (a) N single photons are generated in Alice’s laboratory She randomly chooses between the diagonal basis A1 = σx and rectilinear basis A2 = σz and the random bit values 0 and 1 to prepare her state on the photon. Test mode, his measurement bases are randomly chosen (b′) When Bob chooses the signal mode, Alice and Bob publish their measurement bases through the public channel They keep their measurement outcomes in the same bases as the sifted key bits. In the prepare-and-measure QKD, Eve’s ability to attack on the communication can be bounded with the collective attack[3,45] In this case, the rate for Eve to tag Bob’s key bits is upper bounded with[46,47].

Refute the detector side channel attack
The performance of the present protocol
With probability
Discussion and Conclusion
Additional Information
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.