Quantum key distribution with an unknown and untrusted source

Abstract

The security of a standard bidirectional ``plug-and-play'' quantum key distribution (QKD) system has been an open question for a long time. This is mainly because its source is equivalently controlled by an eavesdropper, which means the source is unknown and untrusted. Qualitative discussion on this subject has been made previously. In this paper, we solve this question directly by presenting the quantitative security analysis on a general class of QKD protocols whose sources are unknown and untrusted. The securities of standard Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, $\text{weak}+\text{vacuum}$ decoy state protocol, and one-decoy state protocol, with unknown and untrusted sources are rigorously proved. We derive rigorous lower bounds to the secure key generation rates of the above three protocols. Our numerical simulation results show that QKD with an untrusted source gives a key generation rate that is close to that with a trusted source.