Abstract

Rating scales are popular methods for generating quantitative data directly by persons rather than automated technologies. But scholars increasingly challenge their foundations. This article contributes epistemological and methodological analyses of the processes involved in person-generated quantification. They are crucial for measurement because data analyses can reveal information about study phenomena only if relevant properties were encoded systematically in the data. The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) is applied to explore psychological and social-science concepts of measurement and quantification, including representational measurement theory, psychometric theories and their precursors in psychophysics. These are compared to theories from metrology specifying object-dependence of measurement processes and subject-independence of outcomes as key criteria, which allow tracing data to the instances measured and the ways they were quantified. Separate histories notwithstanding, the article’s basic premise is that general principles of scientific measurement and quantification should apply to all sciences. It elaborates principles by which these metrological criteria can be implemented also in psychology and social sciences, while considering their research objects’ peculiarities. Application of these principles is illustrated by quantifications of individual-specific behaviors (‘personality’). The demands rating methods impose on data-generating persons are deconstructed and compared with the demands involved in other quantitative methods (e.g., ethological observations). These analyses highlight problematic requirements for raters. Rating methods sufficiently specify neither the empirical study phenomena nor the symbolic systems used as data nor rules of assignment between them. Instead, pronounced individual differences in raters’ interpretation and use of items and scales indicate considerable subjectivity in data generation. Together with recoding scale categories into numbers, this introduces a twofold break in the traceability of rating data, compromising interpretability of findings. These insights question common reliability and validity concepts for ratings and provide novel explanations for replicability problems. Specifically, rating methods standardize only data formats but not the actual data generation. Measurement requires data generation processes to be adapted to the study phenomena’s properties and the measurement-executing persons’ abilities and interpretations, rather than to numerical outcome formats facilitating statistical analyses. Researchers must finally investigate how people actually generate ratings to specify the representational systems underlying rating data.

Highlights

  • Quantifications are central to many fields of research and applied settings because numerical data allow to analyze information using the power of mathematics (Chalmers, 2013; Porter, 1995; Trierweiler and Stricker, 1998)

  • Scholars from various disciplines scrutinize their underlying epistemologies and measurement theories (Wagoner and Valsiner, 2005; Trendler, 2009; Vautier et al, 2012; Hammersley, 2013; Bringmann and Eronen, 2015; Buntins et al, 2016; Tafreshi et al, 2016; Bruschi, 2017; Humphry, 2017; Valsiner, 2017; Guyon et al, 2018). These developments are still largely unnoticed by mainstream psychologists who currently focus on the replication crisis, which they aim to solve by scrutinizing the epistemological foundations of significance testing, confidence interval estimations and Bayesian approaches (Nosek et al, 2015; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Wagenmakers et al, 2016; Zwaan et al, 2017)—by improving issues of data analysis

  • This article contributes to current debates an enquiry of the epistemological and methodological foundations of rating scales, which psychologists and social scientists widely use to generate quantitative data directly by persons rather than using technologies

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Quantifications are central to many fields of research and applied settings because numerical data allow to analyze information using the power of mathematics (Chalmers, 2013; Porter, 1995; Trierweiler and Stricker, 1998). -called ‘quantitative’ data are commonly generated by lay people who may be largely unaware of the positivist epistemology underlying the scales they are ticking. Even if they knew, what would this tell them about how to generate data? The empirical interrelations among ratings items used to assess the same personality factor (e.g., ‘outgoing’ and ‘not reserved’ for Extraversion) varied unsystematically across 25 countries, averaging around zero (Ludeke and Larsen, 2017) These findings seriously question what information these ratings capture. What specific knowledge do raters apply? Could it be that ‘outgoing’ has not the same meaning for students and the general public and not the same for people from different countries? How do raters choose the scale categories to indicate their judgements? What does “agree” mean to different people and in what ways is this related to their intuitive judgements and scientists’ axioms of quantity? Rating data have been used intensely for almost a century (Thurstone, 1928; Likert, 1932); but still little is known about the processes by which raters generate these data

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