Quantité et qualité des plaisirs chez Bentham

Abstract

This paper suggests an alternative view to the usual interpretation of Bentham's psychological theory. After Mill's comments on his thought, it is often argued that Bentham failed to understand the complex nature of the human heart, but in his attempt to make an exhaustive classification of pleasures and pains, he actually was faced with a major epistemological problem which is not solved by Mill's criticism. Far from being insensitive to quality, Bentham carefully distinguished different kinds of perceptions, so as to define the ends of legislation, and guide public action. His typology was to be used as a tool in redress policies, which means that he did not view happiness as a homogeneous aggregate which could be composed of any sort of perceptions. The reason why he did not grant litterature and arts a higher intrinsic value than other kinds of amusements, is that he was only interested in the possible consequences of men's actions and preferences, and hence thought that the legislator and the moralist were not entitled to pass judgment on harmless occupations, but had to confine themselves to forming a general frame inside which private individuals were to be left free to pursue their own ends, provided they did not hurt others. Thus, Bentham's scepticism in the field of aesthetics provides grounds for toleration and is, as such, politically interesting