Abstract
To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a canonical supergame, which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average over all adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the supergame.
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