Abstract
This chapter lays out the general theory of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) for normal-form games. It starts with the reduced-form approach to QR, based on the direct specification of “regular” quantal or smoothed best-response functions required to satisfy four intuitive axioms of stochastic choice. A simple asymmetric matching pennies game is used to illustrate these ideas and show that QRE imposes strong restrictions on the data, even without parametric assumptions on the quantal response functions. Particular attention is given to the logit QRE, since it is the most commonly used approach taken when QRE is applied to experimental or other data. The discussion includes the topological and limiting properties of logit QRE and connections with refinement concepts. QRE is also related to several other equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior in games, including a game-theoretic equilibrium version of Luce's (1959) model of individual choice, Rosenthal's (1989) linear response model, and Van Damme's (1987) control cost model; these connections are explained in the chapter.
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