Quando a corte se divide: coalizões majoritárias mínimas no Supremo Tribunal Federal / When the court is divided: minimum-winning coalitions in Brazil’s Supreme Court

Abstract

DOI: 10.1590/2179-8966/2017/23724 Resumo O objetivo do artigo e discutir o comportamento decisorio no Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) no controle de constitucionalidade das leis, analisando a dinâmica de funcionamento do colegiado quando “cada voto conta”, ou seja, em casos decididos de forma apertada, por margem de 1 ou 2 votos. Realizamos, para isso, um estudo exploratorio com base nas Acoes Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade (ADIs) julgadas pelo colegiado do STF entre 1988-2014, buscando responder: i) com que frequencia e em que situacoes o tribunal ficou dividido nos julgamentos de ADIs? ii) como os ministros se compuseram para votar nessas acoes, mapeando a constituicao e a fluidez das coalizoes majoritarias minimas, e iii) como se deu o processo deliberativo nesses casos? Respondemos a essas questoes descritivas, reunindo elementos empiricos para discutir os determinantes das coalizoes majoritarias minimas, e melhor compreender o comportamento decisorio do Supremo, no sentido de dialogar com argumentos que entendem o processo decisorio dessa corte como personalista, questionando sua capacidade de deliberacao colegiada – o que traria problemas de legitimidade democratica para a instituicao. Concluimos que o Supremo foi bastante consensual no periodo analisado, ficando “dividido” em apenas 3% do total de decisoes colegiadas. Em termos da composicao de votacao, houve bastante fluidez na corte, mas apesar dessa fluidez, identificamos fatores que tornam a constituicao de coalizoes mais previsiveis, como a combinacao do tema em julgamento e a trajetoria de carreira pregressa dos ministros, havendo indicios de que ministros oriundos da magistratura tem maior probabilidade de votar em conjunto do que dividir seus votos. Verificamos, ainda, que o processo deliberativo no tribunal se deu com intensa troca de argumentos, mudanca de direcao de votos e debates. A principal contribuicao do artigo e, portanto, a relativizacao das teses do personalismo decisorio, apresentando evidencias da centralidade do colegiado no processo deliberativo e na construcao das decisoes do STF. Palavras-chave: Supremo tribunal federal; Processo decisorio; Coalizoes majoritarias minimas. Abstract The aim of this article is to examine the decision-making behavior in Brazil’s Supreme Court judicial review cases, analyzing the dynamics of the collegial body in situations where every vote counts, i.e., in cases that divided the court being decided by a margin of 1 or 2 votes. To do so, we conducted an exploratory study analyzing judicial review cases (ADIs) decided by the Supreme Court from 1988 to 2014, seeking to answer: i) how often and in which situations the court was divided in ADIs trials? ii) how compositions were formed, mapping the constitution and the fluidity of the minimum winning coalitions, and iii) how did its deliberative process flow? We answered to these descriptive questions, gathering empirical evidence to discuss the determinants of the minimum winning coalitions, in order to better understand the decision-making behavior of Supreme Court, dialoguing with arguments that understand the decision-making process of this court as personalistic, questioning its potential as a collegial body - which would pose concerns to democratic legitimacy of the institution. We conclude the Supreme Court was very consensual in the period analyzed, being divided into only 3% of all decisions. In terms of voting composition, we found much fluidity in coalitions, but even so we identified factors that make coalitions more predictable, like combination of the subject being questioned and the past career of Justices. We found strong evidence that Justices with career in the judiciary are more likely to vote together than to divide their votes. We also observed that the deliberative process in the court occurred with intense exchange of arguments, changes in vote direction and debates. The main contribution of this article is therefore the relativization of the personalism in decisions, presenting evidence of the centrality of the collegial game in the deliberative process and in the construction of decisions of the Brazil’s Supreme Court. Keywords: Supreme court; Decision-making process; Minimum winning coalition.