Abstract

That time is a dimension of justice is widely accepted and reflected in the legal aphorism 'justice delayed is justice denied'. One of the most prominent devices of English civil procedure for ensuring that justice is not denied by delay is the interlocutory injunction. The philosophy behind this procedure is that in cases of urgency the court may issue an interlocutory injunction which is intended, not to determine the parties' rights, but to preserve stability while the parties follow the full procedural course. Further, it holds that any harm that may be caused to rights following a decision to grant or withhold interlocutory relief will be put right in final judgment. Central to this philosophy is the notion that the court could take urgent and timely measures to ensure that its ability to do justice is not undermined by delay and, at the same time, could maintain the normal procedural safeguards considered essential for obtaining correct judgments. Thus the philosophy of the interlocutory process presupposes that the measures taken to promote timely resolutions need not compromise the prospect of giving the party who is in the right his due. This philosophy will be shown to be flawed. The need for timely decisions cannot always be satisfied without some sacrifice in the quality of the procedure and a consequent diminution in the level of accuracy. It shall be argued that the present interlocutory strategy conceals the real costs in terms of procedural

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