Abstract
ABSTRACT Despite the deterrence effect generated by antitrust laws, the fact is that many collusive agreements end up forming in the economy. An essential task is to understand how distinct market characteristics affect cartel profits and damages. This paper develops a theoretical model to assess which characteristics of price-fixing agreements are related to greater damage to consumers. Results indicate the following characteristics as responsible for greater damage: higher product similarity (substitutability); lower elasticity of demand (in absolute values); greater number of members; higher demand potential; and a higher velocity of transactions. Price-fixing agreements that have these characteristics more intensely, in comparison to others, tend to be more harmful to consumers, and, therefore, should be prioritized by antitrust authorities regarding detection, prosecution, and punishment.
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