Quadripartite Evolutionary Game of Sustainable Development of Supply Chain Finance with Government Participation

Abstract

Under the background of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, green supply chain finance (GSCF) points out the sustainable development direction of supply chain finance (SCF). In order to study the mutual influence of GSCF participants’ decision-making and the effectiveness of government promotion, this paper builds an evolutionary game (EG) model that consist of “governments, financial institutions (FIs), core enterprises (CEs) and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)”, discusses the stability of strategy selection, and uses MATLAB to conduct numerical simulations. The research results show that: (1) Government’s participation can effectively promote the sustainable development of SCF; (2) In order to maximize incentives for FIs to carry out a GSCF business, large penalties for non-loan and subsidies similar to the income difference between traditional commercial loans and green loans (GL) should be implemented at the same time; (3) The stability of supply chain (SC) cooperation and reasonable risk compensation to CEs can promote its guarantee; (4) The increase in the expected profit of SC and the increase in the positive effect of GM in the industry are conducive to promoting GM in SMEs.