Quad 2.0 in flux, how possible? A study of India’s changing ‘significant other’

Abstract

ABSTRACTWhen the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) was resuscitated in November 2017, it was framed as a minilateral grouping of liberal democratic countries to build a free and open Indo-Pacific in the shadow of China’s growing assertiveness. However, this Quad 2.0 had not taken collective action until 2021. The four states neither held leaders’ summit meetings nor issued joint statements after lower-level meetings. They took no joint quadrilateral actions to deter China either. From a constructivist perspective, this paper addresses this puzzle by critically revisiting the alleged common identity of the four states. It argues that India’s national identity has not been built on the ontological difference between liberal democracy and autocracy but on a complex amalgamation of non-alignment, post-imperial ideology, Hindu nationalism and Indian exceptionalism. India, having held a vision of establishing an India–China partnership in Asia, did not regard China as its significant Other until the deadly border clashes between them in June 2020. China’s expansionism has challenged India’s identity as the pre-eminent power in South Asia and its vision of an equal China–India partnership. Despite India’s increased cooperation with its Quad partners since then, the Quad is built more on geopolitical pragmatism than on shared liberal norms and values.