Abstract

In the wake of the 2010/11 Arab uprisings, Qatar is seen to have taken significant foreign policy risks in supporting Islamists, including the moderate Islamist Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB). This chapter will show that Qatar’s support for the SMB was not precarious, but pragmatic, based on Qatar’s constructed identity and a specific political environment between 2011 and August 2013. Regional dynamics in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East, at the time, predisposed the Qatari government to view the Syrian uprising as an opportunity to enhance Qatar’s influence in the region. The chapter will also demonstrate that Qatar’s support for the SMB against the one-party Ba’th regime initially resonated with many actors in the region and internationally.

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