Abstract

Idealization is ubiquitous in human cognition, and so is the inclination to be puzzled by it: what to make of ideal gas, infinitely large populations, homo economicus, perfectly just society, known to violate matters of fact? This is apparent in social science theorizing (from J. H. von Thünen, J. S. Mill, and Max Weber to Milton Friedman and Thomas Schelling), recent philosophy of science analyzing scientific modeling, and the debate over ideal and non-ideal theory in political philosophy (since John Rawls). I will offer a set of concepts and principles to improve transparency about the precise contents of idealizations (in terms of negligibility, applicability, tractability, and early-step status) and their distinct functions (such as contributing to minimal modeling, benchmark modeling, and how-possibly modeling).

Highlights

  • Mass point, frictionless plane, vacuum, ideal gas, infinitely large populations, immortal humans, perfect competition, perfectly informed agents, zeroPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 50(3)transaction costs, and so on

  • This involves an applicability component: the idealizations are supposed to be adequate when applied to the study of the economic domain; and one may expect the presence of other motives to be more negligible in this domain than in some non-economic domains

  • That there are suspicions and confusions about idealizations in general or about particular idealizations is unsurprising given that they appear to conflict with known facts and that it is often unclear what their point is

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Frictionless plane, vacuum, ideal gas, infinitely large populations, immortal humans, perfect competition, perfectly informed agents, zero. There is persistent puzzlement about what to make of idealizations because they appear to be in stark conflict with the facts as we know them and because their useful functions are seldom fully transparent. I will examine these puzzlements in the social sciences, through authors such as J. I will not argue for or against any particular idealization, but will outline a framework—a few organizing concepts and general principles—within which debates over any idealization can be fruitfully carried out. This requires clarifying the very idea of idealization, the alternative intended contents of various idealizations, and the distinct functions served by them

Puzzlement
Idealization
Why Idealize?
Functions of Idealization
Contents of Idealizing Assumptions
Puzzlements Again
Minimal Model Idealization
Milton Friedman 1953
Benchmark Model Idealization
Thünen Again
Max Weber and Ideal Types
How-Possibly Model Idealization
Normative Ideal Idealization
Conclusion
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.