Abstract
The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have. However, the canonical tripartite analysis of knowledge does not do justice to it due to a Platonic conception of a priori truth that puts the cart before the horse. Within a pragmatic approach, I argue that by doing away with a priori truth, namely by submitting truth to justification, and by accordingly altering the canonical analysis of knowledge, this is a fruitful definition. So fruitful indeed that it renders the Gettier counterexamples vacuous, allowing positive work in epistemology and related disciplines.
Highlights
The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have
Since Plato that a promising conception of knowledge is that of justified true belief.[2]
The first problem with this analysis is the adherence to the Rylean distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how,[3] and the restriction to the first kind, i.e. to knowledge of propositions, namely of propositions fitting into the structure “S believes that ...,” where “...” can be filled in with a wellformed proposition p
Summary
It is very well to state that S’s belief that snow is white is true when referring to the world, but how can S be assured of the truth of her/his beliefs about the world? Seemingly, the first step for S to truth-valuate conclusively these beliefs that s/he begins by holding is to go out in the world and check, i.e. empirically test (see, taste, touch, etc), and verify, given the conditions of the world, and perhaps with assistance from other already valuated beliefs, that they are true beliefs. John knows that the building whose façade he sees is a barn It is Henry’s being justified in believing that he is looking at a barn that makes the proposition/belief “this is a barn” true. Thirdly, we do not fall into endless debates around truth that, though intricate enough, have brought no progress to philosophy; truth as coherence, correspondence, or even identity, to name but the most querulous stands with regard to truth, cease to interfere with progress in epistemological matters This said, let us see how this concept of justification ad veritatem fulfils the promise of the concept of knowledge as true belief. I am, among others, referring to the already mentioned Gettier counterexamples, to which I am ready to pay due attention
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