Putting state‐formation first: some recommendations for reconstruction and peace‐making in Afghanistan

Abstract

AbstractThe authors suggest a revision of the current strategy of reconstruction and peace‐building in Afghanistan with reference to four points. (i) The programme of reconstruction should have a clear strategic focus and be designed as a state‐building project. The main problem Afghanistan faces is the absence of a monopoly of power and of other basic state functions, without which no sustainable economic development is to be expected. Fostering ‘civil society’—the standard pre‐occupation of many current development co‐operation programmes—may have a negative impact in the cases of countries suffering from state failure. (ii) A monopoly of power cannot be established only by building up a central army and disarming or integrating local armed forces. Rather, the loyalty of the country's citizens must be won through a long‐term process of providing them with equality before the law and protection from arbitrary violence in such a way as to make them independent of the ‘protection’ of local strong men or regional warlords. (iii) It is too early to achieve democracy in Afghanistan through elections. A democracy can only release the potential for political integration following successful political stabilization and institutional consolidation. And the institutional framework should be designed in such a way as to avoid an escalation of conflicts along ethno‐religious lines. An ethno‐religious quota system of the sort that many have in mind at the moment would tend rather to increase such conflict than to reduce it. (iv) A programme of reconstruction and peace‐making must necessarily take a long‐term perspective. Spending the resources that have now been approved over the next four years and hoping for a continuation of aid approvals in the future is too risky, given the dependence of these approvals on the future political climate. © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.