Abstract
ABSTRACT Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter turns, in two contrasting ways, on the role of experts. On the one hand, Caplan uses the opinions of economists as a benchmark for identifying error in public opinion, finding such error systematic and pervasive. On the other hand, in considering remedies, he largely discounts the ability of policymakers to use expert advice and their own expertise to resist misguided public pressure. Although Caplan’s use of expert opinion as a benchmark, in principle, is acceptable, he overstates what we can conclude from that exercise with his data. There are, however, alternative grounds for a more tentative, yet broadly similar, assessment of the prevalence of error in mass opinion.
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