Putin's Olympics: The Sochi Games and the Evolution of Twenty-First Century Russia by Orttung Robert W. (review)

Abstract

SEER, 98, 3, JULY 2020 592 could afford?) to have her text style-edited by a knowledgeable native speaker. To give just one example, Mikhail Shatrov’s influential 1986 play is called, in English, The Dictatorship of Conscience, not The Dictatorship of Consciousness (p. 184). Any chance of an improved second edition? The contents deserve it. University of Glasgow Martin Dewhirst Orttung, Robert W. and Zhemukhov, Sufian N. Putin’s Olympics: The Sochi Games and the Evolution of Twenty-First Century Russia. BASEES/ Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, 109. Routledge, London and New York, 2017. xiv + 135 pp. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. Index. £115.00. In Putin’s Olympics, Robert Orttung and Sufian Zhemukhov analyse the bidding for, preparation for, and running of the Sochi Winter Games within the broader context of Russian domestic and foreign policy goals. In doing so, they argue that the Games ‘facilitated widespread corruption, the development of extensive security forces, and a crackdown on civil society’, which they consider ‘defining features of the Putin era’ (p. 1). The authors place their analysis of the Sochi Olympics within the growing body of literature on ‘mega events and mega-projects’ which they claim offers ‘a new conceptual path in the study of Russia politics’ (p. 2). Considered as part of Vladimir Putin’s overall preference for development through mega-projects, the Sochi Olympics, they assert, ‘promote[d] regime stability by providing a sense of national pride for the masses and a source of rent distribution for key elites whose support is crucial for the leadership to maintain the status quo’ (p. 32). The second and third chapters explore the contribution of the Sochi project to endemic corruption and repression of civil society in Russia. Cost overruns resulted in a price-tag of over 50 billion dollars which lined the pockets of Putin’s cronies and the scale of the project allowed powerful state and business authorities to use the games to ‘impose their developmental preferences on society with little oversight or accountability’ (p. 39). Citizens had their property seized without adequate compensation, public parks and forests were encroached upon without due environmental impact taken into account, and political opposition groups were largely silenced by anti-demonstration measures, anti-NGO laws, as well as laws banning ‘propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations’ to repress the LGBTQ community (p. 52). Chapter five considers how these measures influenced the international perception of the Sochi Games. Because of the Olympics’ global significance, members of the Circassian diaspora were able REVIEWS 593 to bring international attention to their historical and ongoing repression by Russian authorities and Russia’s anti-LGBTQ legislation spawned an international campaign to boycott the event. While a boycott and serious political demonstrations at the games were avoided, internal repression and external aggression marred Russia’s image internationally. The most significant contribution of the volume to understanding recent Russian politics lies in chapter four which analyses security at the games. According to the authors, the Sochi Olympics provided Putin’s regime with the military strength and coordination necessary to launch a successful annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine before the Olympic torch was extinguished. Seeking to draw an impenetrable cordon around Sochi to protect the region from terrorist attacks, Putin moved away from earlier soft-power efforts, resorting to a series of ‘anti-terrorism operations’ in the region, which caused the deaths of hundreds of insurgents, civilians, and Russian law enforcement officers. The operations prevented any terrorist attacks in Sochi during the games, despite the bombings in nearby Volgograd months before the Olympics. This militarization of Olympic security aided the authorities’ crackdown on dissent and provided an opportunity to showcase ‘the newest military technologies’ as ‘foreign orders for Russian weapons grew’ by $14 billion in the months after the games concluded (p. 74). The expansive security apparatus and centralized administration created for the games provided the perfect conditions for a successful military action as Olympstroi became Krymstroi and its head Dmitrii Kozak transferred his mega-project organizing skills to reintegrating Crimea into Russia. In their final assessment, Orttung and Zhemukhov conclude that the games mostly served to enrich Putin’s associates, increase regime stability, and provide...