Abstract
Do workers' first jobs affect their careers? Do such first-job effects (FJEs) vary across worker types? If so, can policy improve upon a “free” labor market by altering initial worker-employer matches? We study these questions using Norway's pre-2013 system of assigning doctors to their first job–residencies–through a random serial dictatorship. This generated individual-level variation in workers' choice sets over employers, which we use as instrumental variables to estimate FJEs. We then decompose workers' preferences over first employers into FJEs-on-earnings and employer “amenity value” components, showing how matches and worker welfare changed in the post-2013 decentralized labor market.
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