Abstract
AbstractInternationally, policymakers assume that sanctioning claimants of unemployment benefits will engender both improved employment outcomes and wider positive effects. A growing evidence‐base challenges these expectations, though additional insight is needed from large‐scale longitudinal research. This article contributes by conducting a quantitative investigation into the mental health impacts of benefit sanctions. To do so, it focuses on a recent period in UK sanctions policy in which rates of sanctions varied markedly and their length was substantially increased. Using quarterly panel data for local authorities in England (Q3 2010–Q4 2014) and fixed effects models that control for important confounders, the analysis provides robust evidence that Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) sanctions lead to increases in self‐reported anxiety and depression. Evidence of this adverse impact is particularly clear following the increase in the length of sanctions in October 2012. The results have important implications for contemporary social security policy, which is underpinned by a similarly punitive sanctions regime. Whilst additional individual‐level research is needed to fully consider the causal relationships in operation, the findings support a precautionary approach that should seek to minimise the harm associated with sanctions. This implies taking steps to reduce both the severity and frequency of applied sanctions.
Highlights
Benefit sanctions, in the UK and internationally, are used to enforce the conditions of unemployment benefit receipt (Immervoll & Knotz, 2018)
This latter reform is of continued relevance within the UK's social security system, since it underpins the enforcement of benefit conditions for Universal Credit (UC)
This investigation provides robust evidence that sanctions are associated with adverse mental health impacts, measured in terms of self-reported anxiety and/or depression at the local authority-level
Summary
In the UK and internationally, are used to enforce the conditions of unemployment benefit receipt (Immervoll & Knotz, 2018). Each of these investigations have identified various concerns, repeatedly highlighting the paucity of the evidence-base used to inform the increase in sanctions severity in 2012, as well as the lack of a subsequent evaluation into its effects In this regard, this article focuses on mental health impacts, using available data at the local authority-level to address the following research questions: Q1. This reform increased both the minimum and maximum length of JSA sanctions, meaning that the sanctions data used in this analysis are qualitatively different in the latter period To take this into account, the initial fixed effects model is augmented in the second stage, through the inclusion of an interaction between Sanctions and a dummy variable Reform that is zero in the quarters prior to the reform and one from Q4 2012 onwards: Anxietyi,t = β0 + β1Sanctionsi,t + β2ðSanctionsi,t*ReformtÞ + β0Xi,t + Qt + μi + λt + εi,t ð2Þ. The remainder of this chapter details the results of these fixed effects regressions and goes on to discuss the implications of the findings obtained
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