Punitive Damages

Abstract

Abstract Those who favour or oppose the award of punitive damages by the common law courts face a common problem. Those who favour such awards being made do so because they can see that there is some reason for such awards being made. But the question can be immediately put: is this rea-son a good enough reason to justify on its own making an award of punitive damages? For example, the Law Commission favours making awards of punitive damages where ordering a defendant to make compensation to the victim of his wrong would not be enough to deter others from such wrongdoing in future. But is this a good enough reason to justify on its own making an award of punitive damages? What makes anyone think that deterring people from committing breaches of their obligations is a legitimate function of the common law or the law in general? Similarly, it can be suggested that awards of punitive damages could be justified where they have the effect of preventing someone enriching himself by committing a wrong to another. But is this a good enough reason to justify on its own making an award of punitive damages? What basis is there for the belief that people who gain wealth by wronging others should have their enrichment stripped from them? Those who oppose awards of punitive damages being made do so because they can see that there are any number of reasons for not making such awards.