Abstract
Strong negative reciprocity, that is, sanctions imposed on norm violators at the punisher’s own expense, has powerful cooperation-enhancing effects in both real-life and experimental game situations. However, it is plausible that punishment may obtain alternative roles depending on social context and the personality characteristics of participants. We examined the occurrence of punishing behavior among 80 subjects in a strongly competitive Public Goods game setting. Despite the punishment condition, the amount of the contributions decreased steadily during the game. The amount of contributions had no significant effect on received and imposed punishments. The results indicate that certain social contexts (in this case, intensive competition) exert modifying effects on the role that punishment takes on. Subjects punished each other in order to achieve a higher rank and a financially better outcome. Punishment primarily functioned as a means of rivalry, instead of as a way of second-order cooperation, as strong reciprocity suggests. These results indicate the need for the possible modification of the social conditions of punishment mechanisms described by the strong reciprocity theory as an evolutionary explanation of human cooperation.
Highlights
These results indicate the need for the possible modification of the social conditions of punishment mechanisms described by the strong reciprocity theory as an evolutionary explanation of human cooperation
Among the most influential theories attempting to explain the evolution of human cooperation and altruism today we find kin selection, reciprocal altruism, reputation-based altruism, spatial reciprocity and the focus of the present study, the theory of strong reciprocity [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22]
According to the strong reciprocity theory, cooperative tendencies should be positively selected for when sanctions are applied against those individuals who breach the norms of the community
Summary
Introduction and Theoretical BackgroundAmong the most influential theories attempting to explain the evolution of human cooperation and altruism today we find kin selection, reciprocal altruism, reputation-based altruism, spatial reciprocity and the focus of the present study, the theory of strong reciprocity [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22]. In the case of strong negative reciprocity or social punishment, the individual who prefers cooperation is willing to sacrifice resources in order to punish or sanction those who free ride on others. The research paradigm most commonly used for testing strong reciprocity theory is the Public Goods game, which is one of the most widely applicable models for so-called social dilemma situations [13, 21,22,23]. Such situations typically offer different decisional possibilities and behavioral alternatives in which individual and common interests are incompatible with each other. The behavior that would be beneficial for all is less profitable for the individual than the selfish alternative, yet it would severely harm the interests of the community if PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0120394 March 26, 2015
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