Abstract

There is a view of Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice which has enjoyed some following among tort theorists in recent years, according to which corrective justice isdistinctfrom distributive justice and entirelyindependentof it. The distinctness of the two is, of course, asserted by Aristotle in a well-known passage in theNicomachean Ethics, and no one could seriously doubt that he does take theformsof these two kinds of justice to be distinct:What is just in distributions of common assets will always fit the [geometrical] proportion mentioned above,... On the other hand, what is just in transactions is certainly equal in a way, and what is unjust is unequal; but still it fits numerical proportion, not the [geometrical] proportion of the other species.

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