Abstract
Abstract In the context of road network congestion, public provision of information is a way to convince drivers to act more socially by shifting their Wardrop equilibrium. In this paper we establish a framework to pose the problem in a road traffic approach and characterize the disclosure mechanism. The games considered are single-commodity road networks subject to independent vagaries. An omniscient controller partially discloses his information to a population of non-cooperative drivers, in a message at the entrance of the network. For the two-route network with single vagary case, we provide a complete characterization of the optimal public signaling policy and, in particular, identify situations where neither full nor no-disclosure is optimal. We also show how to extend the framework of Bayesian persuasion to the context of road networks under multitple independent vagaries.
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