Abstract

ABSTRACT During the First Republic (1889–1930), also known as the Old Republic, and the Provisional Government of Getúlio Vargas (1930–1934), Brazilian public sector accounting institutions underwent a phase of accelerated reforms. This study examines how budgetary imbalances, political interference in the ways of calculating the budget results, and foreign loan negotiations affected these reforms. We analyse primary and secondary sources to establish the link between the reforms of accounting institutions, budgetary policy, and foreign loan negotiations. The analysis is qualitative and instrumentally employs the concepts of institutions and public accountability. We utilise quantitative data to provide a picture of the Brazilian fiscal context. The collected evidence indicates that the financing of coffee stocks gave rise to the reinforcement of the double-entry bookkeeping method in the State of São Paulo in 1906. It also shows that the federal fiscal imbalances required foreign financing and that the loan negotiations induced changes in the Treasury’s accounting in 1914, in the regulation of the Central Accounting Office in 1924, and in the Accounting Code in 1931. We argue that the search for calculative legitimacy for political programmes led to interference in the Central Accounting Office in 1927 and 1931, which affected the comparability of budgetary results.

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