Public resources allocation using an uncertain cooperative game among vulnerable groups

Abstract

PurposeThis paper aims to solve the problem of public resource allocation among vulnerable groups by proposing a new method called uncertainα-coordination value based on uncertain cooperative game.Design/methodology/approachFirst, explicit forms of uncertain Shapley value with Chouqet integral form and uncertain centre-of-gravity of imputation-set (CIS) value are defined separately on the basis of uncertainty theory and cooperative game. Then, a convex combination of the two values above called the uncertainα-coordination value is used as the best solution. This study proves that the proposed methods meet the basic properties of cooperative game.FindingsThe uncertainα-coordination value is used to solve a public medical resource allocation problem in fuzzy coalitions and uncertain payoffs. Compared with other methods, theα-coordination value can solve such problem effectively because it balances the worries of vulnerable group’s further development and group fairness.Originality/valueIn this paper, an extension of classical cooperative game called uncertain cooperative game is proposed, in which players choose any level of participation in a game and relate uncertainty with the value of the game. A new function called uncertainα-Coordination value is proposed to allocate public resources amongst vulnerable groups in an uncertain environment, a topic that has not been explored yet. The definitions of uncertain Shapley value with Choquet integral form and uncertainCISvalue are proposed separately to establish uncertainα-Coordination value.