Abstract

This article considers the justification of laws to religious citizens. It does via a consideration of the debate surround the teaching of Intelligent Design. It argues that one widely held view of political morality, public reason liberalism, requires that schools should allow teaching ID. This is contrary to the views of many defenders of this theory. I show that this argument reveals a deep problem with public reason liberalism, and that it undermines the judgement of the court in the high profile case of Kitzmiller vs Dover.

Highlights

  • This paper discusses whether public schools should be permitted, or perhaps required, to teach intelligent design (ID) alongside mainstream Darwinian theory (DT)

  • I show that this argument reveals a deep problem with public reason liberalism, and that it undermines the judgement of the court in the high profile case of Kitzmiller vs Dover

  • I revisit the question posed by Thomas Nagel: What would a biology class teach if it wanted to remain neutral on the question of whether divine intervention in the process of life’s development was a possibility, while acknowledging that people disagree about whether it should be regarded as a possibility at all, or what probability should be assigned to it...?

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses whether public schools should be permitted, or perhaps required, to teach intelligent design (ID) alongside mainstream Darwinian theory (DT). Steven Macedo writes that debates over religious accommodation and liberal neutrality have played out most ‘dramatically’ in the educational arena.[4] In education, the aim of many philosophers and lawyers is to be as inclusive as possible, at least amongst reasonable doctrines. Sometimes this aim conflicts with another valuable goal of education, namely teaching children the best available theories about how the world works, those most likely to be true. The paper explores the nature and implications of public reason, which is one of the central principles in many contemporary views of liberal justice with broad applications to many aspects of law and policy

BACKGROUND
FOUR POSSIBLE VIEWS ABOUT ID
UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
OVERVIEW OF CENTRAL ARGUMENT
Premise 2
Premise 4
Premise 5
Instrumental Benefits of DT
Teaching and Truth
A Theological Mistake?
CONCLUSION
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