Abstract

Most public reason theorists believe that citizens are under a ‘duty of restraint’. Citizens must refrain from supporting laws for which they have only non-public reasons, such as religious reasons. The theo-ethical equilibrium argument purports to show that theists should accept this duty, on the basis of their religious convictions. Theists’ beliefs about God’s nature should lead them to doubt moral claims for which they cannot find secular grounds, and to refrain from imposing such claims upon others. If successful, this argument would defuse prominent objections to public reason liberalism. This paper assesses the theo-ethical equilibrium argument, with a specific focus on Christian citizens. I argue that Christians should seek theo-ethical equilibrium, but need not endorse the duty of restraint. I establish this in part through examining the important theological concept of natural law. That discussion also points to more general and persistent problems with defining ‘public reasons’.

Highlights

  • Most public reason theorists believe that citizens are under a ‘duty of restraint’

  • The theo-ethical equilibrium argument purports to show that theists should accept this duty, on the basis of their religious convictions

  • I establish this in part through examining the important theological concept of natural law

Read more

Summary

THE THEO-ETHICAL EQUILIBRIUM ARGUMENT

Robert Audi and Michael Perry both argue that, given their beliefs about God’s nature, Christians should expect to find non-religious grounds for moral truths.[9]. Perry concurs: ‘no religious argument about the requirements of human well-being should be deemed sufficiently strong to ground a political choice, least of all a coercive political choice, unless a persuasive secular argument reaches the same conclusion’.16 This argument, if sound, gives Christians theological reasons to accept a core aspect of PRL’s duty of restraint. The secular reasons for laws that Christians find persuasive, and are contained in theo-ethical equilibrium, are likely to usually be Rawlsian public reasons. Even if (most) public reason liberals justify the duty of restraint (primarily) on normative grounds, they should be open to Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to consider this point. The TEE argument is important precisely because it seeks to justify one of the most contentious implications of PRL for religious citizens

INITIAL ASSESSMENT
EBERLE’S OBJECTION
NATURAL LAW
The High View of Natural Law
The Low View of Natural Law
The Moderate View of Natural Law
REVISITING THE HIGH VIEW AND RESTRAINT
CONCLUSION
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call