Abstract

This article discusses the approach of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to interpreting and applying the right to personal liberty, in particular in relation to the judicial control of the deprivation of liberty. It appears that both institutions adopt an interpretative approach that aligns with the object and purpose of the right. However, in the application to individual cases, unlike the ECtHR, the HRC fails to clarify the scope of the relevant provision of the ICCPR, specifically, the independence and impartiality of the public prosecutor as ‘an other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power’. That situation may ultimately undermine a more effective attainment of the object and purpose of the right to personal liberty. The article argues for the HRC to adopt a more systematic approach to interpreting and applying that right in particular and the provisions of the ICCPR in general.

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