Abstract

In this dissertation, I examine how political environments influence industry structure and entrepreneurial opportunities following deregulation. Within the competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC) industry, which was created by the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, I find that founding rates of CLECs were higher in states with more experience with incentive-based regulation and in those states with new governors or new commissioners. I also find that states were attractive expansion targets when their political and regulatory characteristics were similar to those of a CLEC's founding state and when they had new governors or new commissioners. Together, my findings support my argument that a state's current policy is built upon its previous policies and that changes in political leadership can serve as punctuating moments that stimulate competition and industry development.

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