Public Policy and Action for Conservation

Abstract

IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY budget allocations to specified projects are made by the elected representatives of the people, and the size of the allotment reveals the judgments of these representatives as hammered out through committee proceedings, in which are reflected economic pressures, political pressures, and value judgments. In this process, pressure groups and special interests all attempt to obtain favorable action; after a project or program has once been started and its funds are allocated annually the action agency itself develops an interest in perpetuating its work and increasing the allocation of funds for its use. When funds are first allotted to a project the end stated is usually broad in scope and there may be very little information available upon which intelligent judgments can be made. Once the program is in operation, however, information that forms a better basis for judgment is collected by the action agency and presented to obtain the most favorable action by congress or its committees. Since all agencies tend to compete for limited funds this desire to retain public confidence encourages efficiency and the formulation of policies that will meet with the greatest public approval. At this level the statements of ends to be pursued are necessarily broad and couched in common sense terms rather than in exact scientific