Public Party Funding and the Schemes of Mice and Men

Abstract

A main aim of public party funding was to present parties with opportunities to participate on equal terms in public debate and to finance their ability to represent the general public. However, its impact on party communication and on party-voter contacts is a neglected aspect of research in the field. This paper suggests a disparity between intentions and consequences, mirroring that observed in the effects of public party funding on party expenditure, inter-party competition and party structure. This is illustrated by a case study of campaign finances and party communication in Israel since the inception of public party funding, with special attention to the 1992 elections, in which it spurred a shift to a `top-bottom' model of campaigning and to a concentration on the system management and ritualistic dimensions of electoral communications. It came at the expense of messages geared to enlist support for alternative prospective policies. The ensuing party-voter rifts and the effort to bridge them by reforming public party funding may throw light on the problematics of public party funding in western democracies and on the progress towards what have recently been termed cartel parties.